# Two-Sided Platforms and Competition Policy: What have we <u>really</u> learned?

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
#### What have we really learned in theory?

- Implications for market definition
  - Business models are not markets
- Challenging for regulation, often ignored by competition authorities
  - Does it matter if we have good data and can calculate the 'right' elasticities?
- Note (1): one-sided logic wrong in two-sided markets (e.g., mark-ups of individual services, margin test)
- Note (2): because of externalities, two-sided markets, even if competitive, are not efficient

## What have we I really learned?

- Expect and account for feedback effects
- E.g., regulation of mobile termination rates
  - Collected quarterly data for 20 countries over 10 years, empirical work with Christos Genakos

#### The "waterbed" effect



Quarters around the introduction of Regulation (T)

## The "net neutrality" debate


#### Facts

- issue of congestion (limited capacity)
- some services are more time-sensitive than others
  - e.g., video conferences, online video games and certain cloud services are time-sensitive

#### Economic issues:

- Are the users' ISPs allowed to charge also CPs?
- Are ISPs allowed to make differentiated offers to CPs (QoS)?
- Are ISPs allowed to prioritize different type of service over others (discrimination)?

#### The net neutrality debate



#### The net neutrality debate


- Are the users' ISPs allowed to charge also CPs?
  - View in parts of the public that this amount to doublecharging
    - This view contradicts two-sided market logic
    - Use two-sided market theory to understand implications of regulating the price on one side to zero
- Are ISPs allowed to make differentiated offers to CPs?
  - Efficiency arguments: prices signal value and cost
  - Market power concerns
    - Should be dealt with competition law
    - If not enough, look at structural remedies

## Market power and unbundling


- Impact on broadband (LLU)
- Recent study by Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2015)
- Microdata at the level of each Local Exchange ( = Central Office) in the UK, 2005-2010
- Results:
  - LLU unbundling did NOT increase penetration, but...
  - It increased quality (speed)
  - Competition from alternative technology (cable) is the most important factor to increase both penetration and speed

## Impact of LLU


Penetration? NO



Entry of LLU operators? YES



#### Speed? YES



#### **Implications**

- Almost inevitably, wider relevant markets
- Will be more difficult to intervene ex post
- Ex ante approach when market failures are endemic (bottleneck)
- Unbundling is an option, but m-management and takes time
- Inter-platform competition much more effective